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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. At issue is whether taxpayer's case is rendered moot by 
the repeal of 31 U.S.C. Sec. 314. 
2. At issue is whether the judiciary has authority to 
decide what constitutes the standard of value. 
3. At issue is whether the judiciary has authority to 
review congressional action conducted under Article I, Section 10 
of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
4. At issue is whether the Utah County Assessor utilized 
the correct statutory and constitutionally-acceptable standard of 
value by which to measure the value of the taxpayer's property. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
31 U.S.C. Section 314 
The dollar consisting of [twenty-five and 
eight-tenths grams of] gold nine-tenths fine, as 
established by section thirty-five hundred and 
eleven of the Revised Statutes of the United 
States (former 31 U.S.C.A. Sec. 315), shall be the 
standard unit of value, and all forms of money 
issued or coined by the United States shall be 
maintained at a parity of value with this 
standard, and it shall be the duty of the 
secretary of the treasury to maintain such parity. 
(Repealed by Public Law 97-258 on September 13, 1982 [96 Stat. 
877].) 
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States of 
America 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, 
Alliance or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; 
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender 
in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto law, or law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 
31 U.S.C* Section 392 (1976), now revised and codified as 31 
U.S.C.A. Section 5103 
Section 5103. Legal tender 
United States coins and currency (including 
Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of 
Federal reserve banks and national banks) are 
legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, 
and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not 
legal tender for debts. 
(Pub.L. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 980; Pub.L. 97-452, Sec. 
1(19), Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2477.) 
59-5-1 U.C.A., 1953 as amended 
All taxable property, not specifically exempt 
under Article XIII, Section 2 of the Constitution 
of Utah, must be assessed at 20% of its reasonable 
fair cash value. 
(Statute as of January 1, 1982.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of Case 
In this case, the taxpayer seeks review of a decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission and the Tax Division of the Third 
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District Court respecting his claim that the Utah County 
Assessor's utilization of federal reserve notes in determining 
value and amount of taxes on his property located in Utah 
County, Utah, was constitutionally impermissible. Taxpayer 
admits that he takes no issue with the valuation placed upon his 
property as it is expressed in "Federal Reserve Notes." But he 
contends that the Utah County Assessor in the measurement, 
determination, estimation, appraisal, or reporting of the value 
of taxpayer's property did not apply or use the "standard of 
value" set forth in Title 31, Section 314 of the United States 
Code; dollars as measured in gold. 
(b) Disposition in the Utah State Tax Commission and 
Tax Division of the Third District Court 
This matter was duly appealed from a decision of the Utah 
County Board of Equalization to the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Tax Commission granted Utah County's and Salt Lake County's 
motion to dismiss on the basis, according to its Code of 
Administrative Procedure, that it was "not the proper board or 
agency to consider the petition" and that the Tax Commission 
could not grant the relief which was sought. Taxpayer filed a 
Petition for Review with the Tax Division of the Third District 
Court. The Court granted Utah County's and Salt Lake County's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
(c) Statement of Facts 
Joe Ferguson is a resident and owner of real property 
situated in Utah County, Utah. Said property was valued by Utah 
County as of January 1, 1982, at its fair market value. Taxpayer 
duly received his tax notice for tax year 1982. 
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Taxpayer challenged the valuation of his property before the 
Utah County Board of Equalization. The Board considered the 
information presented and denied the petition for relief. 
That decision was timely.appealed to the Utah State Tax 
Commission and a hearing was held on May 12, 1983. A formal 
decision issued on July 5, 1984. As all questions of value were 
resolved prior to the hearing, the Tax Commission addressed the 
issues of standard of value. The Tax Commission declined to 
issue an advisory opinion or declaratory judgment upon the 
questions set forth in taxpayer's petition and granted Utah 
County's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Utah State Tax 
Commission was "not the proper board or agency to consider" that 
petition and that "the commission cannot grant the relief 
sought." 
That decision was timely appealed to the Tax Division of the 
Third District Court, which action was dismissed upon motion by 
Utah County and Salt Lake County. 
The Utah County Assessor admitted that he utilized federal 
reserve notes in valuing the property and determining the taxes. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is not within the purview of the state judiciary to 
declare what legal tender is. Likewise, that declaration by 
Congress is a political question not subject to review by this 
Court. This Court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 
State courts which have addressed the arguments of this case 
describe the arguments as specious or frivolous. 
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The taxpayer's reasoning is strained in contending that the 
mere utilization of federal reserve notes by the Utah County 
Assessor constitutes a violation of U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 10. 
Federal reserve notes, on an equal basis with other currencies of 
the United States, are legal tender for the payment of all debts. 
Certainly, it is not the local assessor who is responsible for 
that determination; it is Congress. No violation of 
constitutional law has occurred by virtue of the action of the 
Utah County Assessor. 
Third, the taxpayer urges that this Court adopt the standard 
of value as expressed in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 314. This position must 
be rejected on the basis that 31 U.S.C. Sec. 314 has been 
repealed and, therefore, that standard of value could only apply 
to tax year 1982. 
A review of all proceedings confirms that the Utah County 
Assessor complied with all applicable statutes and constitutional 
provisions. Surely a local assessor is not charged with any duty 
of valuing property based upon a gold standard which has been 
repealed. 
If taxpayer is to prevail in his battle against the 
utilization of federal reserve notes in society, that case must 
be taken to a proper forum where the challenge can be heard on 
its merits; a U.S. Federal District Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDICIARY HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DECLARE 
WHAT IS MONEY; THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
RESERVES THAT EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO THE CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The wisdom and expediency of the actions of Congress which 
are the subject of the matter in controversy do not constitute a 
judicial question but rather a political question over which the 
judiciary has no jurisdiction. The power to declare what shall 
be money and regulate its value is vested in Congress, which has 
constitutional power to make paper money legal tender. Norman v. 
B. & O.R. Co.; 294 U.S. 140; 55 S. Ct. 407; 79 L.Ed. 885 (1935); 
U.S.C.A. Constitution Art. 1, Section 8, CI. 5, 10, CI. 1; Allen 
v. Craig, 564 P.2d 552; 1 Kan. App.2d 301 (1977). The Utah 
Supreme Court has no subject matter jurisdiction nor can it 
determine whether Congress has acted wisely or expediently in 
exercise of its powers to declare what shall be money or to 
regulate value of money. To declare what shall be legal tender 
is a political question that is not subject to judicial review. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, Section 8, CI. 5, 10, CI. 1; 31 U.S.C.A. 
Section 5103 (previously Section 392). 
It was decided in Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421; 4 S. 
Ct. 122; 28 L.Ed. 204 (1884), that the Congress has the 
constitutional power to make paper money legal tender. 
Determination of the constitutionality issue would require 
judicial review of the actions of Congress in the exercise of its 
power. 
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The constitutionality of Title 31 U.S.C.A. Section 392 
(1976), now revised and codified as 31 U.S.C.A. Section 5103 
(1983), was before the United States Supreme Court in Guaranty 
Trust Co, v. Henwood, 307 U.S, 247; 59 S. Ct. 847 (1939). The 
Court held: 
"Under these powers, Congress was authorized— 
as it did in the Resolution—to establish, 
regulate and control the national currency and 
to make that currency legal tender, money for all 
purposes . . . Whether it was 'wise and expedient' 
to do so was, under the Constitution, a deter-
mination to be made by that Congress . . . 
(p. 259, 59 S. Ct. 853). 
In Juilliard v. Greenman, supra, it was also held that the 
question of currency is a political question, to be determined by 
Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial 
question, to be afterwards passed upon by the courts . . ." 
(emphasis added) (110 U.S. 450, 4 S. Ct. 131). 
This Court has no subject matter jurisdiction; the exclusive 
right of declaring what is money is reserved in the Congress of 
the United States. 
Arguments substantially similar to those presented by 
taxpayer have been uniformly rejected in both federal and state 
courts in recent years. See, e.g., Leitch v. State Department of 
Revenue, 16 Or.App. 627, 519 P.2d 1045 (1974); Brubrad Company v. 
United States Postal Service, 404 F.Supp. 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); 
and United States v. Wangrud, 533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976); Radue 
v. Zanaty, 293 Ala. 585, 308 So.2d 242 (1975); Rush v. Casco Bank 
& Trust Co., 348 A.2d 237 (Me. 1975); Chermack v. Bjornson, 302 
Minn. 213, 223 N.W.2d 659, cert. den. 421 U.S. 915, 95 S.Ct. 
1573, 43 L.Ed.2d 780 (1974); United States v. Benson, 592 F.2d 
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157 (5th Cir. 1979); Mathes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
576 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1978); Epperly v. State of Alaska, 648 P.2d 
609 (1982); J. Trohimovich v. Director of the Department of Labor 
and Industries of the State of Washington, Wash. App. 584 P.2d 
467; Lowry v. State of Alaska, 655 P.2d 780 (1982); Cohn v. 
Tucson Electric Power, 673 P.2d 334 (Ariz. App. 1983); State v. 
Pina, 561 P.2d 43. 
POINT II 
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF ARTICLE If 
SECTION 10 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
Congress has lawfully made federal reserve notes legal 
tender for public and private debts. 31 U.S.C.A. Section 371 
(1976), now revised and codified as 31 U.S.C.A. Section 5103 
(1983); Cohn v. Tucson Electric Power Co., supra. 
The taxpayer has misconstrued the meaning and intent of 
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. The purpose of this 
provision was to prevent the individual states from establishing 
their own separate currencies and, under Article I, Section 8, to 
vest Congress with the sole authority to establish a uniform 
national currency and regulate value thereof. That power has 
been long established. It operates as a limitation of state's 
power but not United States Congress1 power to determine legal 
tender. 
In Chermack, supra, the Court stated: 
The courts have consistently held that the 
Constitution leaves the power to declare what shall 
be legal tender for the payment of all debts to 
Congress. The mere utilization of a standard of 
legal tender prescribed by Congress is not state 
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action as prohibited by U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 
10, but rather an effectuation of validly exercised 
constitutional power of Congress under U.S. Const., 
Art. 1, Sec. 8 . . . (emphasis added) 
In Trohimovich, supra, the taxpayer disputed the value of 
federal reserve notes and he converted what he called "pseudo 
dollars" into "statutory dollars" by a formula which was founded 
upon daily final price fixings of gold on the London market and 
which recognized value disparity between a "statutory dollar" and 
"paper dollars" as represented by the federal reserve notes then 
in circulation. The Court found that federal reserve notes, as 
declared by Congress in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 392, shall be legal 
tender. 
That same result was reached in United States v. Wangrud, 
533 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 
64, 50 L.Ed.2d 79, where the Court held: 
By statute it is established that federal reserve 
notes, on an equal basis with other coins and currencies 
of the United States shall be legal tender for all debts, 
public and private, including taxes. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 392 
(Supp. 1976)(pp. 495-496) 
A recent Mississippi case addressed the issue of utilization 
of federal reserve notes in taxation and is squarely on point. 
In the case, Middlebrook v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 
387 So.2d 726 (1980), the Court held that income tax assessments 
were not invalid on the ground that they were based on federal 
reserve notes, not "dollars." The Court relied upon the Federal 
Reserve Act, Section 16, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 412 and 31 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 392 in reaching that decision. The Court went on to note 
that: 
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Congress has made the Federal Reserve Notes 
the measure of value in one monetary system, 12 
U.S.C- section 412 (1968), and has defined Federal 
Reserve Notes as 'legal tender for all debts, 
public and private, public charges, taxes, duties 
and dues.1 [31 U.S.C. sec. 392 (1965)]. 
Lastly, in Leitch, supra, the Oregon Court held that it was 
the federal government, not the state, that had made all coins 
and currencies of the United States legal tender. 
POINT III 
THE CASE OF THE TAXPAYER IS MOOT. 
The taxpayer represents, as a basic thesis, that at the time 
of valuation of the property, the "dollar" as defined in 31 
U.S.C. 314, was the correct and constitutionally-acceptable and 
only statutory congressional standard of value in the United 
States of America. Brief of Petitioners at 13. Taxpayer has 
overlooked the fact that 31 U.S.C. Sec. 314 was repealed by 
Public Law 97-258 on September 13, 1982 (96 Stat. 877). 
Taxpayer would have this Court impose upon the Utah County 
Assessor, a standard based upon a provision in the United States 
Code which has been repealed. Its repeal renders moot taxpayer's 
challenge of the methodology utilized by the Utah County Assessor 
in arriving at value of taxpayer's property. 
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POINT IV 
THE UTAH COUNTY ASSESSOR PROPERLY AND LEGALLY 
PERFORMED ALL STATUTORY DUTIES IN CONFORMITY 
WITH STATE LAW IN VALUING PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY. 
The Utah County Assessor breached no duty in valuing the 
taxpayer's property. The duties of a county assessor are found 
in 17-17-1 U.C.A., 1953 as amended: 
The assessor in cooperation with the state 
tax commission shall perform the duties 
prescribed by law. 
The assessor has the further duty to assess all property at 
its value as of the 1st day of January at 12 o'clock a.m. Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 U. 491, 210 P. 106; 59-5-
4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended. Plaintiff does not contest the value 
as measured in federal reserve notes, only the appropriateness, 
legality and constitutionality of their use. 
The lien date in the subject case was January 1, 1982. 
Section 59-5-1 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, provided at that time: 
All taxable property, not specifically 
exempt under Article XIII, section 2 of 
the Constitution of Utah, must be assessed 
at 20% of its reasonable fair cash value, 
(emphasis added) 
The Utah County Assessor strictly complied with all 
provisions of 59-5-1 U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
The subject property was valued by using its "fair cash 
value" as provided in 59-5-1 U.C.A., 1953 as amended. This "fair 
cash value" has been routinely and consistently interpreted by 
the Courts of this state as meaning the market value of the 
property in question or the price in money which would be agreed 
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upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and a 
purchaser willing to buy. Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Salt 
Lake County, 122 Utah 421, 250 P.2d 938. The Utah State Tax 
Commission administers 59-5-1. Kennecott Copper Corporation v. 
State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 90 L.Ed. 862, 66 S.Ct. 745, 
affirming 150 F.2d 905. 
The Utah County Assessor faithfully complied with all 
statutory duties under 59-5-1 and 59-5-4 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, 
and all other applicable laws and duties imposed on his office. 
CONCLUSION 
Taxpayer's contention that the Utah County Assessor is 
constitutionally prohibited from assessing property based upon a 
federal reserve note standard is without merit. While there are 
no Utah cases, taxpayers in other jurisdictions have raised the 
same fundamental questions in recent years. Those contentions 
have been universally rejected. 
The taxpayer has chosen to use the Utah County Assessor as a 
whipping boy to express his disdain for the federal reserve 
system. To challenge an act of Congress by suing a local 
assessor makes no sense. The Utah County Assessor did not make 
the federal reserve note legal tender, Congress did. In the case 
at bench, it is apparent that rather than violating 
constitutional mandates, the Utah County Assessor adhered to the 
provisions of Utah Const, art. XIII Section 1(1), Utah Const. 
art. XIII Section 3(1) and all applicable state statutes. The 
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proper forum to challenge the Federal Reserve Banking System is 
the U.S. Federal District Court with the Federal Reserve Bank as 
a party defendant. 
It is abundantly clear from all case law that the "standard" 
that taxpayer would have this Court adopt has been repealed, that 
the utilization of federal reserve notes in taxation methodology 
and property valuation does not constitute a violation of Article 
I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, that Congress 
has exclusive authority to determine such matters, and that the 
judiciary is without jurisdiction. 
The states cannot declare what shall be money, or regulate 
its value. Whatever power there is over the currency is vested 
in the Congress. 
For the above reasons, the appeal of taxpayer, Ferguson, is 
without merit and the ruling of the Utah County Board of 
Equalization, the State Tax Commission and Tax Division of the 
Third District Court must be upheld. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Utah County Attorney 
LI 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Utah County Assessor 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Const, art. XIII Section 1(1): 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate in proportion to its value, to 
be ascertained as provided by law. 
Utah Const, art. XIII Section 3(1): 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment on all tangible 
property in the state, according to its value 
in money, except as otherwise provided in 
Section 2 of this Article . . . 
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